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 Executive Summary 
1. In the wake of recurring conflicts, there has been a renewed focus 
on the use of political tools of diplomacy and mediation combined 
with the provision of long-term capacity-building support to 
conflict-affected countries to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts 
and, through peacebuilding, to build effective and inclusive 
institutions as a basis for sustainable peace. This has created new 
opportunities as well as challenges for the United Nations (UN) 
across its peace and security pillar, in particular for the Department 
of Political Affairs (DPA), the political arm of the UN Secretariat, for 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the 
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). 
2. The complex demands and expectations of building core national 
capacities in fragile societies in the areas of conflict prevention, 
mediation and inclusive political processes, while ensuring that UN 
good offices, crisis response and peacemaking services were easily 
and rapidly deployable, have required the UN to construct enhanced 
partnerships with traditional as well as non-traditional partners 
with a view to bolstering the resource base, scaling up capacity, 
developing best practices and harmonizing policies. In particular, 
the preference indicated by conflict-affected countries for assistance 
from the South, recent mandates by intergovernmental bodies, and 
initiatives taken by other stakeholders within and outside the UN 
system have created a pressing context for the Organization as a 
whole and its constituent departments to consider enhancing 
partnerships with the Global South to realize the potential of South–
South cooperation in the shared interest of building sustainable 
peace. 
3. Noting the gap between increasing demands and resources available 
for mobilization in support of conflict-affected countries in five 
priority areas,  including in the area of ‘inclusive political processes’ 
where the DPA was identified as the lead UN actor for delivery of 
support,1 a 2011 Civilian Capacity Review recommended the need to 
deepen/widen the pool of deployable civilian expertise, particularly 
from countries in the Global South with relevant experience in post-
                                                          
1  The other four priority areas identified were basic safety and security, justice, 
economic revitalization, and core government functionalities. 
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conflict peacebuilding and democratic transitions. These 
recommendations, subsequently endorsed by the Security Council 
and the General Assembly, represented a first attempt to harness 
systematically the wealth of knowledge, expertise and resources in 
the Global South and broaden the application of the 
developmentally-focused framework for South–South cooperation 
to include the peace and security pillar as part of a comprehensive 
and coherent system-wide strategy to provide long-term, effective, 
tailored and sustainable support to conflict-affected countries. 
4. Recognition of the Global South as a potential source of relevant 
civilian expertise has evolved against the background of the 
emergence of major democratic powers (‘emerging powers’) in the 
Global South,2 such as India, Brazil and South Africa,3 and their 
growing engagement in fragile societies within the framework of 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements. In addition to contributing 
resources at a time of global austerity, the emerging powers can 
offer alternative models of conflict management and development, 
shaped by their recent transition experiences that could be more 
easily replicated and adapted to the local contexts of other 
developing countries. Rejecting Western donor–recipient models of 
assistance in favour of a South–South framework for cooperation 
that underscored a partnership among equals for mutual benefit and 
relying on their own experiences in successful democratic 
transitions as well as peace agendas and strategic interests, the 
emerging powers have redefined international assistance and 
peacebuilding as an expression of solidarity and shared experiences 
and also pushed for a more inclusive and representative global 
governance architecture. Consequently, any efforts to enhance 
partnership with the Global South and the emerging powers as 
providers of civilian assistance and expertise require a keen 
understanding of these global dynamics and the South–South 
cooperation framework within which the countries of the Global 
South prefer to operate – bilaterally and multilaterally. 
                                                          
2  The significance of the emergence of the Global South and resurgence in South–
South cooperation were the main themes of several UN annual publications in 
2013, including the UNDP’s Human Development Report, The Rise of the South: 
Human Progress in a Diverse World, 2013, which examines the profound shift in 
global dynamics that were being driven by the fast-rising powers of the developing 
world – and the implications of this phenomenon for human development and 
progress; and UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)’s, Global 
Development Report, A Renewed Global Partnership for Development, 2013. 
3  The observations in this report are largely restricted to the experiences of the IBSA 
group of emerging democratic countries: India, Brazil and South Africa. 
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5. An appreciation of the ‘new normal’ in the international order, 
defined by resurgence in South–South cooperation and the dynamic 
engagement and leverage of the emerging powers in fragile societies 
and multilateral forums, is critical to the UN for implementation of 
its core mandate in the maintenance of international peace and 
security, a mandate that has become increasingly more operational, 
complex and expansive. It would allow the UN to better align 
resources with its responsibilities and increase its effectiveness and 
impact, including by tapping into the enormous potential of South–
South cooperation to provide relevant models and capacity. With 
the recognition that most conflicts are fundamentally political in 
nature, the role of the DPA in particular has become central to 
initiating and coordinating system-wide conflict prevention, 
peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts.4 The recent resistance of 
emerging powers to bring South–South cooperation support 
activities and OECD–DAC assistance under a common framework of 
aid effectiveness has underscored the need for the DPA and other 
UN stakeholders to play an effective role in bringing fragmented 
international responses to conflict under a coherent framework. By 
genuinely helping to incorporate the perspectives and approaches of 
traditional and non-traditional actors alike and contributing to the 
formulation of a UN position, the DPA, in close coordination with 
the PBSO, could better position itself to play a catalytic role and 
work with the wider UN membership in implementing conflict 
prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding mandates. With its 
robust network at headquarters, proximity to the workings of key 
intergovernmental bodies such as the Security Council, and an 
expanding presence in the field, the DPA is uniquely positioned to 
play such a policy role. 
6. The substantial experience of the various UN agencies, funds, 
programmes and offices, including the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), in supporting and mainstreaming South–South 
cooperation in all aspects of their work could allow the UN 
Secretariat, in particular the DPA, the DPKO and the PBSO, to 
leverage the existing architecture, normative consensus and work 
processes in facilitating triangular and South–South cooperation in 
areas of their work related to conflict prevention, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This becomes relevant also in 
view of the increasing collaboration between the Secretariat, UNDP 
and other agencies, funds and programmes in areas of conflict 
prevention and management and efforts to ‘Deliver as One’ – not 
                                                          
4  This report focuses on the work of DPA only within the UN Secretariat.  
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just in terms of logistics but in developing substantive system-wide 
coherence. For example, in the proposed post-2015 framework, 
there is a strong push to rectify the omission of peace and security in 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) framework as 
development goals and formulate a global agenda that fosters the 
nexus between peace, security and development, ensures coherent 
and consistent policy frameworks, strengthens purpose-oriented 
and long-term partnerships through concrete mechanisms, such as 
South–South cooperation, and enables realization of an ambitious 
agenda and priorities.  
7. This report focuses on the potential for the UN Secretariat, 
particularly the DPA, to benefit from the above-discussed set of 
circumstances. Currently there is no clear, deliberate strategy that 
systematically operationalizes and mainstreams the South–South 
cooperation framework in the DPA to address country-specific as 
well as thematic peace and security challenges – although several 
initiatives within the DPA, however anecdotal and unintended, 
including in its Electoral Assistance Division (EAD), Policy and 
Mediation Division (PMD), Division for Palestinian Rights (DPR) and 
others, could be viewed as supporting and facilitating South–South 
cooperation. Developing a strategy that can bring together these 
aspects, coupled with outreach to increase awareness and 
realization of these initiatives, could strengthen the DPA’s ties with 
South–South cooperation and the emerging powers, stimulating 
serious policy dialogue aimed at furthering the DPA and the UN’s 
impact on issues of importance to the Secretary-General and the 
broader membership. 
8. The present report aims to stimulate an informed and evidence-
based dialogue in the UN Secretariat by reflecting on compelling 
developments and added value for the DPA’s work through 
institutionalization of South–South cooperation as a key modality 
for enlarging and bettering collaborative, coherent and effective 
political initiatives at the national, regional and interregional levels 
in support of conflict-affected countries, in mission as well as non-
mission settings.  
9. The report is divided into six thematic parts, each part containing 
summary observations and recommendations that are also compiled 
in the annex: 
 Part I (Resurgence of South–South cooperation: the game-
changer?) explains the South–South cooperation framework and 
briefly traces enhanced efforts system-wide to facilitate and 
mainstream it in context of development and peacebuilding goals.  
Anita Mathur 
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 Part II (The new normal: exercise of soft power by Southern powers) 
considers the emergence of major powers in the Global South, their 
role and exercise of soft power in fragile societies and multinational 
forums, and the implications of their strong preference for 
functioning within a South–South cooperation framework.  
 Part III (Peacebuilding: a paradigm shift) explores the mutual 
complementarity between the current approach to peacebuilding, 
with its emphasis on long-term capacity building in conflict-
affected countries, and South–South cooperation.  
 Parts IV and V (South–South cooperation in peacebuilding 
mandates; Mapping and matching Southern capacities) provide 
evidence of extensive support for and mainstreaming of South–
South cooperation in intergovernmental mandates relating to 
peacebuilding, as well as noteworthy initiatives of national and 
multilateral organizations to map and match demand with supply 
among countries of the Global South.  
 Part VI (South–South cooperation,  emerging powers and the DPA: 
charting the way forward ) looks at the DPA’s transformation and 
fusion of its analytical capacities at headquarters with operational 
capacities in the field, draws attention to its inadvertent support of 
South–South cooperation in several areas of work, and offers 
actionable recommendations that would lead to the DPA aligning 
its support of South–South cooperation with that of other UN actors 
with a view to strategically playing a catalytic role in harnessing the 
resources of the Global South, formulating a coherent policy 
framework that enhances its partnership with the emerging powers 
and other UN and non-UN actors, and effectively implementing its 
mandate within the recognized resource constraints. 
10. The report has benefited from a four-month-long UN sabbatical 
leave programme.5 The findings could be further enriched through 
additional study of the DPA's collaboration with regional and sub-
regional organizations as well as the role of  DPA regional offices 
in facilitation of South–South cooperation. 
                                                          
5  For the duration of the sabbatical programme, Prof. Jean Krasno, International 
Studies Program, Yale University, served as the supervisor. 
 I. Resurgence of South–South 
cooperation: the game 
changer? 
11. South–South cooperation, originally referred to as ‘technical 
cooperation among developing countries’ (TCDC), has emerged as 
a powerful mechanism or framework for cooperation among 
developing countries that pursue their individual and/or shared 
national capacity development objectives through exchanges of 
knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and 
through regional and interregional collective actions, including 
partnerships involving governments, regional organizations, civil 
society, academia and the private sector. South–South 
cooperation activities have been initiated, organized and managed 
by developing countries themselves and were intended to 
complement, not substitute, North–South cooperation. The 
participation of developed countries and multilateral 
organizations, through triangular cooperation,6 is deemed critical 
to facilitating and fostering South–South cooperation. 
12. The two sets of guiding principles of South–South cooperation as 
confirmed in the Nairobi outcome document adopted in 2009 by 
the High-level Committee are as follows:  
(a) Normative principles, including respect for sovereignty and 
national ownership, non-interference in domestic affairs, 
partnership among equals, demand-driven engagement for 
mutual benefit, non-conditionality 
(b) Operational principles; including mutual accountability, 
development effectiveness (transfer of knowledge with a view 
to strengthening local capacity and developing national 
                                                          
6  According to the Note by the Secretary-General on Framework of operational 
guidelines on United Nations support to South–South and triangular cooperation, 
triangular cooperation involves Southern-driven partnerships between two or more 
developing countries supported by a developed country(ies)/or multilateral 
organization(s) to implement development cooperation programmes and projects. 
For details, see SSC/17/3, p.5. 
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resources), coordination of evidence- and results-based 
initiatives, and a multi-stakeholder approach.7 
13. Persistent calls by the UN Secretary-General and the General 
Assembly8 for the substantial scaling up and institutionalization 
of South–South cooperation have underscored the effective 
knowledge-sharing systems, proven development policy options, 
tested institutional capacity-building solutions and affordable and 
appropriate technologies offered by the Global South. They have 
called upon the UN system to act as promoter and catalyst of 
triangular and South–South cooperation by undertaking key 
actions, as summarized in Figure 1.9  
 
                                                          
7  Ibid., p.7.  
8  For example, see A/RES/67/226, paras. 59, 74–79. 
9  SSC/17/3, p.8. 
 
Convener/ 
advocate 
Bring parties together and facilitate 
policy dialogue for partners to reach 
consensus and coordinate policies and 
strategies for South-South and triangular 
cooperation. Advocate/act as a 
knowledge broker in broader 
international processes to ensure that 
both South-South and triangular 
cooperation are adequately featured in 
the discussions and related outcomes 
Consensus reached; capacity of the 
South to shape policies strengthened; 
Southern perspectives and needs 
integrated into global policies and 
international cooperation for 
development 
 
Analyst and 
progress 
monitor 
Gather and analyse data on global, 
regional and country performance in 
South-South and triangular cooperation; 
and report and follow up on major 
intergovernmental decisions 
Policies and programmes informed by 
data and analysis formulated and 
implemented at global, regional and 
country levels 
Partnership 
builder 
 
Rally development partners; organize 
forums, meetings and events to forge 
inclusive partnerships and strategic 
alliances; mobilize resources and 
expertise; and coordinate United Nations 
support 
Inclusive partnerships and strategic 
alliances forged; technical and 
financial resources mobilized; United 
Nations policies and programmes 
coordinated to deliver as one 
Knowledge 
broker 
 
 
Bridge knowledge gaps by linking supply 
and demand of expertise, experience and 
technology. Good practices identified, 
documented and disseminated 
Knowledge exchanged; successful 
practices documented for adaptation 
or scaling up. Southern institutions, 
professionals, civil society, academia 
and private-sector organizations 
connected and networked 
 
P
ro
ce
ss
 
 O
u
tc
o
m
e 
 
R
o
le
 
 
United Nations support for South-South and triangular cooperation 
Role of South–South Cooperation and Emerging Powers in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding 11 
14. .Recognizing the potential of South–South cooperation for 
development as well as the need to systematically create an 
enabling environment for it, in 1978 the Special Unit for South–
South Cooperation was established within the UNDP as the 
secretariat for the General Assembly High-level Committee on 
South–South cooperation.10 Renamed in 2012 as the United 
Nations Office for South–South Cooperation (UNOSSC), it has been 
mandated to promote, coordinate and provide support for South–
South and triangular cooperation on a global and UN system-wide 
basis by leveraging its global reach as well as its policy and 
institutional capacities.11 Various entities of the UN system 
biennially report to the High-level Committee through UNOSSC on 
progress and achievements on mainstreaming South–South 
cooperation and the state of such cooperation in their respective 
areas of competence. 
15. South–South cooperation has been increasingly mainstreamed as 
a cross-cutting issue in the work and agendas of UN agencies, 
funds and programmes. Through UNOSSC and its Resident 
Coordinator (RC) system, the UNDP has played a key coordinating 
role, at headquarters and in the field. Since 2003, South–South 
cooperation has been integrated into the framework of several 
UNDP practice areas, including democratic governance, poverty 
reduction, and crisis prevention and recovery. Under its multi-year 
funding framework for 2004–2007 and 2008–2011 Strategic 
Plan, the UNDP recognized South–South cooperation as one of the 
‘drivers of development effectiveness’, requiring country offices 
and teams to identify issues, help to establish the conditions 
                                                          
10  The High-level Committee is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and primary 
policymaking entity on South–South cooperation in the United Nations system. For 
details, see http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/Background.html  
11  UNOSSC has facilitated South–South policy dialogues and development as well as 
analysed trends, emerging issues and opportunities for promoting South–South 
and triangular cooperation approaches to development. It has also worked to build 
new partnerships; identify new funding mechanisms, mobilize resources and 
manage various intergovernmental South–South trust funds, like the UN Fund for 
South–South cooperation (UNFSSC), the Pérez-Guerrero Trust Fund (PGTF) for 
Economic and Technical cooperation among Developing Countries (with the Group 
of 77) and the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Fund for Poverty and Hunger 
Alleviation. Through its three-pronged service architecture — the Global South–
South Development Academy, the Global South–South Development Expo and the 
South–South Global Assets and Technology Exchange, UNOSSC has provided 
support for partnerships and linkages among institutions and thematic centres of 
excellence to promote South–South cooperation in several countries, such as the 
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth in Brazil, the Human Development 
Centre in India and the International Public Service Excellence Centre in Singapore.  
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necessary for cooperation, and promote the engagement of 
governments, the private sector and civil society.12 Through its 
role in the United Nations Development Group, the UNDP has 
supported integration of South–South cooperation into the United 
Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) and work 
of the UN Country Teams (UNCTs).13  
16. Since 2008, the UNDP and other agencies, funds and programmes 
have increasingly included South–South cooperation as an 
element of their policy and programming; they have used South–
South approaches in all focus areas through their global, regional 
and country programmes; entered into strategic partnerships with 
several emerging powers to leverage their relevant experience and 
expertise; and generally increased their support to South–South 
cooperation. While acknowledging this progress, a 2011 Joint 
Inspection Unit (JIU) audit report called upon the agencies, funds 
and programmes to establish dedicated and identifiable structures 
and sufficient resources to initiate, coordinate, monitor and report 
South–South cooperation across programmatic activities, and to 
develop a systematic approach and operational guidelines for 
implementing South–South cooperation as a cross-cutting issue in 
all programmatic decisions at corporate and system-wide levels. 
The report also underscored that national governments were 
responsible for setting national priorities and the South–South 
cooperation agenda, and called upon developing countries to 
identify in concrete terms the support they required from the UN 
system.14 As a follow-up to the JIU report, in 2012 a guidance note 
was issued, (a) defining South–South cooperation; (b) identifying 
possible entry points and thematic priorities at the global level 
where UN organizations could apply South–South and triangular 
cooperation approaches when engaging with traditional and 
Southern development partners, developing South–South 
cooperation policies and shaping global norms and standards; 
and (c) offering a step-by-step practical approach to 
mainstreaming South–South and triangular cooperation in UN 
                                                          
12  A/64/504, p. 16. 
13  Review of progress made in implementing the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, the new 
directions strategy for South–South cooperation and the Nairobi outcome 
document of the High-level United Nations Conference on South–South 
cooperation. SSC/17/1, p. 14.  
14  JIU/REP/2011/3, pp.35 and 47–58. Out of 109 countries surveyed, 17 countries 
had included an explicit reference to South–South cooperation in their UNDAFs, 
including seven from Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, 
Mexico and Venezuela.  
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country and regional common planning and programming 
processes.15  
17. The recent accelerated system-wide drive for effective 
mainstreaming of South–South cooperation in the design, 
formulation and implementation of UN programmes came as a 
delayed response to the exponential growth in South–South 
cooperation witnessed outside the UN framework. Within the 
framework of bilateral agreements, involving governments, 
private sector and civil society, South–South cooperation reached 
between USD12.9 billion and 14.8 billion in 201016 as a result of 
resurgence in South–South trade, flows of foreign direct 
investment, technology transfer, movement towards regional 
integration and various other forms of exchanges. Foreign direct 
investment among countries in the South grew by 20 per cent each 
year 1996–2009, driven largely by the rapid ascendancy of major 
powers in the Global South and their willingness to step up 
assistance to co-developing countries.17 India, for example, 
invested about 65 per cent of its outward foreign direct investment 
in developing countries.18 South–South and triangular develop-
ment cooperation have particularly been relevant for in-kind 
contributions (including human resources as seconded personnel 
or volunteers, equipment, products and services), exchange of 
skills, technical support and best practices. Such peer learning as 
well as knowledge, experience and technology sharing have 
proved vital to developing innovative forms of partnerships.19  
18. Beyond bilateral exchanges of knowledge and experience, South–
South cooperation has increasingly involved collective actions in 
addressing trans-regional thematic problems such as food 
security, climate change and HIV/AIDS by multiple countries in 
the pursuit of mutually beneficial development and enhanced 
bargaining power in multilateral negotiations.20 In this context, 
                                                          
15  SSC/17/3, p.3. 
16  Report of the Secretary-General on trends and progress in international 
development cooperation’, E/2012/78, para. 111.  
17  For more information, see Human Development Report, The Rise of the South: 
Human Progress in a Diverse World, UNDP, 2013, pp. 46–47 and Global 
Development Report, A Renewed Global Partnership for Development, United 
Nations (DESA), 2013, p.16. 
18  Anita Mathur, ‘Multinational from Developing Countries: the case of India’ (PhD 
diss., University of Alberta, 1989). 
19  Global Development Report, A Renewed Global Partnership for Development, 
United Nations (DESA), 2013, p. 16. 
20  SSC/17/3, p. 6. 
Anita Mathur 
 
14 
proponents of the New Deal21 have seen the initiative as an 
example of South–South and triangular cooperation, involving 
sharing of successful experiences and expertise among fragile 
states in the area of peacebuilding and statebuilding.22 These 
emerging trends have underlined the need for a wider view of 
South–South cooperation, one that can incorporate a stronger 
peace and security dimension and become a catalyst for successful 
peacebuilding, particularly in the complex task of building state 
capacity.23 
19. Furthermore, through the creation of the Group of 77 in 1964 and 
more recently the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil and South 
Africa), together with the strengthening of regional organizations, 
the South–South cooperation platform has increasingly been used 
by developing countries to advance common positions on issues of 
importance in international negotiations and global governance. 
While the number of countries actively participating in South–
South cooperation has grown tremendously, certain developing 
countries have continued to play a pivotal role. India, Brazil and 
South Africa have emerged in a category of their own because of 
                                                          
21  The conflict-affected group of countries, g7+ including Afghanistan, Burundi, the 
Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and 
Timor-Leste (http://www.g7plus.org/), had noted that ‘aid delivery, interventions 
and programmes instigated by international actors are often inapplicable, 
unsustainable and incompatible with our in-country national agendas … they are 
often not conducive to addressing the immediate or long-term needs of our 
countries and regions’. They challenged the global community and international 
actors ‘to reform, re-invent and commit to a new paradigm of international 
engagement in fragile and conflict-affected countries’, noting that ‘external 
mandates and ideas can no longer be imposed on our countries or regions and our 
peoples’ (S/2011/85). In November 2011, the g7+ countries and their development 
partners outlined the New Deal focusing on country owned pathways towards peace 
and resilience through the framework of peacebuilding and statebuilding. For 
further details, see Vanessa Wyeth, Knights in fragile armor: the rise of ‘G7+’, 
Global Governance, 18 (2012), pp. 7–12. 
22  Maureen Quinn, ‘Ministers Pires and Friis Bach: Fragile States Not Too Fragile to 
Engage in Post-2015 Development Agenda,’ The Global Observatory, 25 April 2013, 
http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/interviews/487-ministers-pires-and-friis-
bach-fragile-states-not-too-fragile-to-engage-in-post-2015-development-agenda.  
23  Fritz Nganje, ‘Decentralized South–South cooperation: A Complementary Vehicle 
for State-Building in Post-Conflict Societies in Africa?’, March 2013, Africa Up 
Close,  
 http://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/decentralised-south-south-cooperation-a-
complementary-vehicle-for-state-building-in-post-conflict-societies-in-africa/ . 
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the scale and agenda of their intra- and inter-regional South–
South cooperation agendas.24  
20. Several developed countries have also mainstreamed South–South 
cooperation within their overall foreign policy frameworks, 
advocated moving beyond the traditional cooperation to 
incorporate South–South and triangular cooperation perspectives, 
experiences and models, and have underscored the need to build 
further understanding of the advantages, complementarities and 
synergies. Japan was one of the first developed countries to 
recognize the complementarity between North–South and South–
South cooperation and offer substantial and sustained support to 
the latter.  
21. However, overall support for triangular cooperation from 
traditional donors has not kept pace with the rise in cooperation 
among developing countries, due partly to lack of consensus 
within developing countries about aligning North–South aid and 
South–South and triangular cooperation.25 Arguing that these are 
two different concepts (see Figure 2), most developing countries, 
including the emerging powers, have expressed concern that the 
alignment would have serious political and policy implications 
and could put into question the very basis and core principles of 
South–South cooperation: sovereignty, solidarity, collective self-
reliance, national ownership and non-conditionality. It would also 
not capture regional or interregional cooperation which South–
South cooperation and triangular cooperation usually entail.26 
These differences found expression at meetings of the seventeenth 
session of the High-level Committee on South–South cooperation 
held in May 2012 where developing countries objected to 
inclusion of references to the New Deal or the ‘Busan Partnership 
for Effective Development cooperation’ in the draft framework of 
operational guidelines on UN support to South–South and 
triangular cooperation, on the grounds that the former was not an 
outcome document of a UN process and thus should not be 
considered as a source of guidance on any UN process. As South–
South cooperation required policy space for developing countries, 
they could not be ‘straitjacketed’ in terms of rigid rules and 
                                                          
24  Promotion of South–South cooperation for development: a thirty-year perspective, 
A/64/504, pp. 8–9. 
25  JIU/REP/2011/3, p. 38. See also the note by the Secretary-General transmitting his 
comments and those of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for 
coordination on the report of the Joint Inspection Unit (A/66/717/Add.1).  
26  Ibid. 
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regulations or policy prescriptions, including in the name of aid 
effectiveness. It was noted that the effectiveness of aid had to be 
judged by the results in each case, and that no across-the-board 
standard would be relevant. Furthermore, there was a paradigm 
difference between North–South and South–South assistance (see 
Figure 2) that no common approach could bridge.27  
Figure 2. Peacebuilding and South–South cooperation: Partnership Models 
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Extension of programmes 
based on progress 
achieved towards pre-
determined benchmarks 
Policy conditionality 
eschewed 
Mutual 
accountability  
Greater accountability 
through 
targets and indicators 
Transfer of skills, 
knowledge and best 
practices 
 
Complementarity Programme objectives 
aligned with the priorities 
of the country concerned 
Demand-driven 
programmes aligned with 
the priorities of the host 
country and 
complementary to North–
South cooperation. 
Emphasis on the 
replication and adaptation 
of successful experiences 
already implemented in 
other developing 
countries. 
 
 
                                                          
27  Report of the High-level Committee on South–South cooperation, A/67/39, p.7. 
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22. To achieve internationally agreed security and development goals, 
including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and related 
peacebuilding goals, various stakeholders have recognized that 
renewed efforts by the UN are required to optimize, intensify and 
mainstream Southern approaches and tap into the potential of 
South–South and triangular cooperation. The expanded mandate 
of the UNOSSC, recent efforts to develop a system-wide approach 
and operational guidelines, and the signing of several strategic 
partnership agreements by the UNDP and other agencies and 
programmes with countries like Brazil, India and Indonesia to 
jointly promote South–South cooperation – all indicate enhanced 
efforts to facilitate South–South cooperation for development. 
However, there remain major challenges to mainstreaming South–
South cooperation, challenges that can be addressed only by 
linking the security and development pillars, developing system-
wide coherence and enhancing cooperation between a diverse 
range of stakeholders, both traditional and new, governments, the 
private sector, civil society and academic institutions.28 Because of 
its global presence and political neutrality, the role of the UN 
system is considered critical, not least for regaining the confidence 
of major provider countries from the South.  
23. Recent developments underscore the need for the UN Secretariat 
across its peace and security pillar to join the ongoing 
deliberations and define South–South cooperation as it relates to 
that area of work. As a starting point, with a view to formulating 
effective joint strategies, an attempt should be made to understand 
and evaluate the practical implications of the UNDP’s enhanced 
efforts to facilitate triangular and South–South cooperation, 
including in context of the DPA–UNDP Programme on Building 
National Capacities for Conflict Prevention (‘the Joint Programme’) 
that continues to focus on a number of strategic initiatives to assist 
national actors in addressing political tensions and build 
infrastructures for peace and assign Peace and Development 
Advisors (PDAs) to the Office of the Resident Coordinators (RCs) in 
over 50 countries. The DPA also co-chairs, alongside the UNDP, 
the Inter-Agency Framework Team for Preventive Action (‘the 
Framework Team’), which supports  the RCs and UNCTs in 
developing integrated conflict prevention strategies. In the context 
of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, there is also growing 
                                                          
28  For the 68th Session of the General Assembly, UNOSSC is expected to submit three 
reports and papers: Milestone Report 2008–2012: A Tribute to Our South–South 
Partners; a second South Report; UNOSSC White Paper on South–South 
cooperation. 
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integration between DPA-led political field missions with a 
mandate to support South–South cooperation (see part IV of the 
report) and Country Teams. 
Summary observations & recommendations 
 South-South cooperation, involving exchanges of affordable 
and appropriate knowledge, skills and solutions among 
developing countries, has been mandated as a priority by 
intergovernmental bodies, requiring the entire UN system to 
take steps towards integrating and institutionalizing it in 
their programmes and approaches.  
 Emergence of major economies in the Global South and their 
eagerness to assist other developing countries, including 
conflict-affected countries, has resulted in the 
mainstreaming of triangular and South-South cooperation in 
peacebuilding activities, particularly in the complex task of 
building state capacity. 
 The nexus between security and development, fostered also 
in the post-2015 framework, has further underscored the 
need for the wider application of the developmentally-
focused South-South cooperation across the peace and 
security pillar of the UN’s work. 
 UN system-wide efforts in 2012 towards developing a more 
systematic approach and operational guidelines for 
implementation of South-South cooperation has made it 
opportune for the DPA and concerned departments across 
the peace and security pillar to advance their understanding 
of processes and mechanisms facilitating South-South 
cooperation and assess the added value of triangular and 
South-South cooperation to areas of their work. 
 
 II. The new normal: exercise of 
soft power by Southern powers 
24. The emergence of such fast-track economic performers as India, 
Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) in the Global South, their 
increasing influence in multinational forums like the Security 
Council, G-20 and the World Bank, as well as their growing role in 
supporting fragile societies, has yet to be adequately reflected as a 
key policy consideration in efforts to expand and enhance 
effectiveness of UN support to conflict-affected countries.29 This 
includes paying greater attention to their transition experiences, 
solidarity with co-developing countries within the framework of 
South–South cooperation, political aspirations for regional 
stability and dominance, desire to serve as a voice for the 
developing world and build legitimacy for a bigger role in global 
governance, including a permanent seat on the Security Council, 
and significant commercial interests in the conflict-affected 
countries combined with an interest in maintaining peace and 
stability.30 Above all, for all forms of effective international 
interventions, it is important to recognize the challenges posed by 
the political bias of the emerging powers towards the state, 
sovereignty, national ownership and non-intervention, their 
emphasis on the intrinsic linkage between security and 
development, and their weariness at serving as ‘instruments’ of 
OECD-led policy frameworks developed outside the UN. 
25. Despite their own economic and political challenges and 
ambiguous status as both contributors and recipients of 
assistance,31 the emerging powers, in a spirit of solidarity, have 
set up extensive bilateral assistance programmes with other 
developing countries within the framework of South–South 
cooperation that extend from the economic sphere to political and 
                                                          
29  Hardeep S. Puri, ‘Rise of the Global South and its impact on south–south 
cooperation’, Perspectives, October 2010, pp. 7–9; Human Development Report, 
‘The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World’, UNDP, 2013. 
30  Jake Sherman, Megan Gleason, W.P.S. Sidhu and Bruce Jones (eds), Engagement on 
development and security: new actors, new debates, New York University Center on 
International Cooperation, 2011, pp. 2–13. 
31  For example, see Sabine Cessou, ‘South Africa’s new apartheid’, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, March 2012. 
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security areas in conflict-affected countries. These demand-driven 
programmes, mostly arranged at the governmental level and 
based on the principles of mutual benefit and partnership, have 
expanded by leaps and bounds at a time when Western donors 
have been forced to slash their programmes. While traditional 
donors still vastly outspend these non-traditional donors, by one 
account, between 2005 and 2010 Brazil and India increased their 
foreign aid spending by more than 20 per cent while the US 
budget grew by just 1.6 per cent over the same period and those of 
Britain, France and Germany by less than 5 per cent annually.32 
During the same period, bilateral trade between emerging powers 
and co-developing countries, within and outside the region, rose 
significantly.33 For example, the volume of trade between India 
and Africa increased from USD1billion in 2001 to USD53.3 billion 
in 2010–2011.34 All three IBSA countries offer enormous 
technical/vocational capacity centred programmes (commonly in 
the form of technical assistance, capacity building, training, 
deputation of experts, study tours, and foreign investment) 
designed to ensure transfer of knowledge and skills to co-
developing countries. The Indian Technical and Economic 
cooperation (ITEC) programme has a network of more than 156 
participating countries and 1,000 national training institutes 
offering a range of programmes, including a programme in 
parliamentary studies and legislative drafting.35 Brazil and South 
Africa have similarly structured programmes with a focus on 
development and capacity building.36 In an OECD and World Bank 
assessment, 25 per cent of Brazil’s technical cooperation exists 
with the ‘fragile states’ in Africa, Asia and Latin America.37 
Between 2008, 2010 and 2012, Brazil’s donations to UN 
humanitarian appeals for some of the poorest countries increased 
by USD3.3 million, 26 million and 54.4 million, respectively.38 
                                                          
32 ‘Look who’s saving the world: BRICS pump up foreign aid’, The Christian Science 
Monitor, 26 March 2012. 
33  It is projected that by 2020 the combined economic output of Brazil, India and 
China will surpass that of the top six traditional economic leaders of the North, 
driven by new trade and partnerships within the South itself. UNDP, Human 
Development Report, 2013, Foreword, p.ii.  
34  India in Africa: Implications for Norwegian Foreign and Development Policies, 
report produced by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 2012. 
35  For details, see http://itec.mea.gov.in/.  
36  Paul Keating and Sharon Wiharta, Synthesis Report of the Baseline Study on 
Civilian Capacity, NUPI, 2012.  
37  Information provided by a researcher at Instituto Igarapé (www.igarape.org.br). 
38  In recognition of Brazil’s contribution and appeal to non-traditional donors, the 
OCHA launched its annual 2013 humanitarian appeal in Brasilia. For details, see 
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The growing economic clout of the emerging powers is also 
reflected in new arrangements among them. 
26. Confronted with relatively limited resources and increasing 
demands, Brazil, India and South Africa have employed novel 
modalities, including partnerships among themselves and with 
traditional donor countries. To promote cooperation among 
themselves, to pool resources and deepen policy coordination in 
joint efforts to assist one another and other developing countries, 
as well as to increase collective bargaining power in multilateral 
forums, the three emerging powers formed the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum as well as the BRICS grouping, which includes China and 
Russia (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).39 They have 
also leveraged the convening role of regional organizations to 
discuss responses to major improvements or deteriorations in 
governance in their respective regions. Examples include South 
Africa’s active participation through the African Union’s 
mediation efforts, the African Peer Review Mechanism, and 
deployment of regional peacekeeping missions.40 The three 
powers have also entered into triangular cooperation with other 
donor countries and multilateral institutions to garner financial 
and institutional support for their assistance programmes. The 
IBSA Fund, established with contributions from the three partner 
countries and located in the UNDP, serves one such example of 
triangular cooperation.41 This arrangement, drawing upon the 
UNDP’s global presence in 170 countries, has allowed the IBSA 
countries to continue to expand their joint and bilateral assistance 
                                                                                                                                        
Jamil Chade, ‘With an eye on getting greater influence in international politics, 
Brazil multiplies by 50 its help to foreign governments’, O Estado de Sao Paulo, 6 
March 2013.  
39  Flexing their growing influence, the BRICS announced at the 2013 summit in 
Durban, South Africa, the start of negotiations for establishing a BRICS-led 
Development Bank, a 25-member Business Council and a Think Tanks Council. For 
details, see BRICS birth a new revolution in South–South cooperation in Durban, 
http://indrus.in/world/2013/03/28/brics_birth_a_new_south-
south_revolution_in_durban_23305.html , 28 March 2013.  
40  In the  context of deployment of civilian capacity to peace operations, South Africa 
appears to have developed the most focused approach, which has included 
supporting development of the civilian component of the Southern African 
Development Community’s (SADC) Standby Arrangement and the African Union’s 
African Standby Force (ASF). 
41  The IBSA Fund is an effort to implement South–South cooperation through the 
multilateral system. It purpose is to identify replicable and scalable projects that 
can be jointly adapted and implemented in interested developing countries as 
examples of best practices in the fight against poverty and hunger. For details, see 
http://tcdc2.undp.org/IBSA/.  
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programmes while developing, strengthening and aligning 
domestic institutions and capacities with their growing economic 
clout and foreign policy ambitions.42 Diplomats from IBSA 
countries have unreservedly expressed frustration at their inability 
to respond promptly to requests for assistance or frame 
multilateral policy proactively such as the OECD-initiated Busan 
‘New Deal’. 43 To overcome the current constraints, they have 
demanded that the UN facilitate policy dialogues and development 
as well as programme implementation and coordination under its 
framework.44 
27. Furthermore, having transitioned into vibrant and stable 
democracies, India, Brazil and South Africa see themselves as 
‘powerful symbols of the potentiality of democracy’ in non-
Western societies.45 However, retaining a commitment to the 
principle of national sovereignty and traditional inhibitions to 
impose democratic values abroad,46 especially through regime 
change,47 the emerging powers have been reluctant to make 
promotion of democracy a key element of their bilateral foreign 
policies or align themselves publicly with Western efforts to 
                                                          
42  Paul Keating and Sharon Wiharta, Synthesis Report of the Baseline Study on 
Civilian Capacity, NUPI, 2012, p. 22. 
43  India has the about the same number of diplomats as ‘little’ New Zealand. See 
‘United by a catchy acronym’, International Herald Tribune, 1–2 Dec. 2012, p.8. 
44  Author interviews with government officials. 
45  The emerging powers are viewed as possessing unique experiences with 
democratization that could be relevant to co-developing countries, including the 
‘Arab Spring’ countries. In a statement delivered in New Delhi, UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon noted that ‘as a successful democracy and with its pluralistic 
diverse society, India had relevant experiences to share with other emerging 
democracies in the Middle East and Africa’, DPI News Bulletin #1, 27 April 2012. 
46  Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs, Looking for help: Will rising democracies 
become international democracy supporters? Carnegie Papers, 2011. 
47  The long-standing commitment of IBSA to national sovereignty and wariness with 
intervention was evident during the Security Council debates on the situations in 
Libya and Syria. In case of Libya, Brazil and India abstained in the vote on Security 
Council Resolution 1973 (2011) authorizing ‘far-reaching measures’. In case of 
Syria, India and South Africa maintained an anti-interventionist approach. For 
details, see studies on the situations in Libya and the Middle East in the Repertoire 
of the Practice of the Security Council, 2010–2011, 
  http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2010-2011/Part%20I/10-11.shtml. Even in 
case of a General Assembly resolution, Arab countries dropped the demand that 
the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad resign, because of lack of support from BRICS 
which was likely to have shaken confidence in the resolution among many 
developing countries. The resolution did, however, take a swipe at Russia and 
China by ‘deploring the Security Council failure’ to act. See Washington Examiner, 2 
August  2012, http://washingtonexaminer.com/un-draft-drops-call-for-syrias-assad-to-step-
down/article/feed/2019067.  
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advance democracy.48 Instead, they have held that ‘successful 
democracy is always home-grown’ and defended the right of 
people to determine their own fate – as in Palestine. More recently, 
in collaboration with multilateral and regional institutions, they 
have supported efforts to build strong, vibrant and critical civil 
societies – a bottom–up rather than a top–down approach. For 
example, in partnership with the USA, India is the second largest 
contributor to the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDF) which 
promotes a bottom–up approach to promoting democracies, 
having contributed USD25 million since 2005 – far more than 
Germany or Britain.49 Brazil helped to found the Rio Group, a 
forum of Latin American democracies that are seeking Latin 
American solutions and a peaceful end to armed conflicts in the 
region.50 It has pressed for the incorporation of democracy 
requirements within regional mechanisms such as Inter-American 
Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States, 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR). South Africa has been a major force 
behind the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) promoting 
good governance in the region. Thus, coordinated by the UN and 
regional organizations, consent-based multilateral efforts in 
conflict-affected countries provide an avenue for the emerging 
powers to balance the tensions in their policies and engage in low-
visibility, sustained support in politically sensitive areas, 
including the promotion of democratic values and inclusive 
political processes.  
28. The extensive history of the emerging powers of sharing their 
unique and diverse experiences, expertise, best practices and 
resources, through development, peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
programmes closer to home-grown efforts, has brought 
recognition and created demand for replication of their successful 
programmes in certain niche areas. For example, Brazil has been 
                                                          
48  ‘BRICS won’t walk with the West on international democracy issues’, The Hindu 
(New Delhi), op-ed, 15 November 2011. 
49  According to the Indian Permanent Mission at the UN, ‘UNDEF supports projects 
that strengthen the voice of civil society, promote human rights, and encourage the 
participation of all groups in democratic processes…The large majority of funds go 
to local civil society groups – in both the transition and the consolidation phases of 
democratization. UNDEF plays a unique role complementing the UN's traditional 
work with Governments to strengthen democratic governance around the world.’ 
For details, see South Asia Daily, 16 April 2012, 
  http://southasia.typepad.com/south_asia_daily/2012/04/building-democracies-from-the-
ground-up-and-not-top-down.html.  
50  Jean-Paul Marthos, Brazil’s emergence and potential for Norwegian peacebuilding, 
NOREF Working Paper, Nov. 2010. 
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involved in scores of programmes in other developing countries, 
mainly in the corrections, wider policing and community-violence 
reduction sectors; India in public works, democratization and 
disaster relief; and South Africa in mediation, transitional justice 
and truth and reconciliation processes.51 Under an arrangement 
with the Government in Afghanistan, India has funded more than 
USD1.3 billion worth of local governance and capacity-enhancing 
and civil-society projects.52 Over the last few years, the UNDP has 
entered into strategic partnerships with each of the emerging 
powers to leverage their domestic transition and capacity-building 
experience with a view to accelerating progress and development 
in other developing countries and increasing its role in South–
South cooperation.53  
29. Guided by historical, political, security and economic 
considerations and ambitions for soft power, the emerging powers 
have prioritized South–South cooperation in all aspects of their 
programmes and reshaped the approach to international 
assistance and sustainable peace, refocusing on approaches and 
innovation conceived in and for the Global South. The three IBSA 
countries have promoted alternative models and strategies that 
prioritize democratic and liberal norms, national ownership, 
inclusive negotiated settlements, unity governments, reconcili-
ation, peace consolidation, political stability, and capacity 
building as the building blocks of states.54 They have underscored 
the intrinsic link between security and development and promoted 
the ‘human approach’ with its emphasis on poverty elimination 
and food security, as root causes of conflict, in efforts to reduce 
violence. Particularly concerned about any dilution of sovereignty, 
they have defended the political bias towards the state and non-
                                                          
51  Paul Keating and Sharon Wiharta, Synthesis Report of the Baseline Study on 
Civilian Capacity, NUPI, 2012, pp. 13 and 15; World Bank’s annual World 
Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development, 2011. 
52  India expanded its political engagement in Afghanistan, despite its traditional 
reluctance and concerns about antagonizing Pakistan, due to pressures from 
several fronts and its own security concerns in the face of the pull-out of NATO 
forces by 2014. For details, see Jake Sherman, Megan Gleason, W.P.S. Sidhu and 
Bruce Jones (eds), Engagement on development and security: new actors, new 
debates, New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 2011, p. 10.  
53 http://www.in.undp.org/content/india/en/home/ourwork/humandevelopment/ 
successstories/undp-and-india-sign-partnership-agreement-to-boost-
development-p.html.  
54  Jake Sherman, Megan Gleason, W.P.S. Sidhu and Bruce Jones (eds), Engagement on 
development and security: new actors, new debates, New York University, Center 
on International Cooperation, 2011, p. 5. 
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intervention as enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. They 
have spurned what they view as a concerted attempt by the OECD 
countries to ‘superimpose’ the elements of donor–recipient 
relationships flowing out of the Paris Declaration and the Accra 
Agenda onto South–South cooperation and ‘co-opt’ the Southern 
providers into the international aid architecture.55 For this reason, 
the IBSA (and BRICS) countries have not signed the New Deal, 
looking instead to the UN to coordinate a process that outlines a 
set of principles for international engagement in fragile societies 
that can encompass both traditional and non-traditional donors. 
30. The strong commitment of the IBSA countries to multilateralism, 
the UN and the existing international order is matched by an 
equally strong desire to gradually reform them to make them more 
inclusive, including expanding the membership of the Security 
Council to allow a bigger role for the emerging powers. 
Commensurate with their global engagement and soft-power 
ambitions,56 the emerging powers have brought their collective 
voice to bear on global issues of importance to them such as 
opposition to intervention in domestic affairs and an obligation, 
while exercising the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), to the 
principle of ‘responsibility while protecting’ (RwP), especially after 
the NATO-led military intervention in Libya.57 Having contributed 
significantly to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, 
they have sought greater recognition of the nexus between 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding – the role of peacekeepers as 
early peacebuilders, particularly in areas of national 
reconciliation, security sector reform, national institution-building 
and economic-social development; and application of the lessons 
and principles of the international development cooperation 
regime to improve coherence between the security and 
                                                          
55  http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/ 
parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm. See also, Hardeep S. Puri (Indian 
Permanent Representative to the UN), ‘Rise of the Global South and its impact on 
South–South cooperation’, Outreach, World Bank Institute, October 2010. 
56  As the United States and Europe consider stronger action in the Security Council, 
the Assad Government has gone on a political offensive, calling on developing 
countries, particularly the BRICS, to find a political solution to the situation in 
Syria. New York Times, 17 March 2013, p. 15.  
57  Oliver P. Richmond & Ioannis Tellidis, ‘The BRICS and international peacebuilding 
and statebuilding’, NOREF Report, January 2013 
 (http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/5f8c6a3d43ec8fff5
692d7b596af2491.pdf).  
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development pillars in field missions.58 At a  Security Council 
meeting held on 21 January 2013, the three countries observed 
that peacebuilding was intrinsic to peacekeeping; that mutual 
complementarities between peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
should be harmonized rather than being zoned as civilian versus 
military aspects, and civilian component of peacekeeping 
missions needed to be strengthened to assist national 
governments in providing early peace dividends.59 Increasingly, 
the emerging powers have displayed confidence in adopting 
different approaches and methods while working with the existing 
international order, as demonstrated by Brazil and Turkey’s joint 
engagement with Iran in 2010 in connection with its nuclear 
programme.60  
31. The emerging powers in the Global South have served as growth 
poles and drivers of connectivity. They have become critical 
sources of experiences and best practices to fragile societies. They 
are important to regional solutions. Further expansion of their 
engagement within a coherent policy framework will necessitate 
reflecting their perspectives and supporting the principles of 
South–South cooperation that underpin their regional, inter-
regional and global engagements. Attempts to co-opt them into 
existing structures would disregard their concerns about 
legitimacy and serving as the voice of the developing world. Such 
attempts would also underestimate the extent to which the 
emerging powers have developed their own policies and 
approaches, influenced by their experiences, partnerships and 
interests. Unless the perspectives of the emerging powers can be 
genuinely reflected in policies developed through a UN-facilitated 
process, there is a real risk that the emerging powers may give up 
on the current global governance system, in favour of an alternate 
system – as glimpsed in recent initiatives taken by IBSA and BRICS 
countries. To harness the full potential of the Global South and the 
emerging powers, minimize duplication of efforts among 
traditional and non-traditional donors and prevent them from 
                                                          
58  Similar positions were echoed at the 6903rd Security Council meeting by several 
speakers, including the Secretary-General, South Korea, China and the UK. See 
also resolution 2086 (2013) adopted at the meeting. 
59  S/PV.6903, p. 26 (Brazil), p. 27 (South Africa), p. 32 (India). 
60  Oliver P. Richmond & Ioannis Tellidis, ‘The BRICS and international peacebuilding 
and statebuilding’, NOREF Report, January 2013 (http://www.peacebuilding.no/ 
var/ezflow_site/ storage/original/application/ 
5f8c6a3d43ec8fff5692d7b596af2491.pdf). In 2012, IBSA countries had also sent a 
joint high-level delegation that unsuccessfully met with Syrian President Bashar Al-
Assad and opposition groups to mediate an end to the violent conflict. 
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working at cross-purposes, the UN, including the DPA, has a 
meaningful role to play in developing a policy framework that can 
adequately take into account the implications of the ascendancy of 
the emerging powers in the global hierarchy of power, 
mainstreaming South–South cooperation as a cross-cutting issue 
at the heart of sustainable peace and security.61   
                                                          
61  Jake Sherman, Megan Gleason, W.P.S. Sidhu and Bruce Jones (ed.), Engagement on 
development and security: new actors, new debates, New York University, Center 
on International cooperation, 2011, p. 11. See also the Report of the High-level 
Committee on South–South cooperation to the 17th session, A/67/39, para. 15. 
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Summary observations & recommendations 
 The emerging powers have become major players in the 
provision of tailored and long-term assistance to conflict-
affected countries within the framework of South-South 
cooperation as well as their broader development 
cooperation programmes, growing commercial interests and 
foreign policy aspirations for regional stability, dominance 
and a bigger role in global governance. 
 The emerging powers have promoted alternate models and 
approaches that prioritize national ownership and capacity-
building, an intrinsic link between security and 
development, the ‘human approach’ with its emphasis on 
poverty elimination and food security as root causes of 
conflict, and the nexus between peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. 
 To take their engagement to the next level, the emerging 
powers have explored novel modalities and partnerships to 
deepen policy coordination and pool resources in efforts to 
help each other and other developing countries as well as 
increase their collective bargaining power in multilateral 
forums. 
 The emerging powers have favoured consent-based regional, 
triangular and multilateral interventions and institutional 
support over bilateral arrangements to scale up their 
engagement in politically sensitive areas, including 
promotion of democratic values and inclusive political 
processes, while balancing commitment to South-South 
cooperation principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and 
national ownership. 
 Wary of attempts to co-opt them into OECD-led international 
aid structures, the emerging powers have looked to the UN to 
play a meaningful role in the development of an integrated 
and coherent policy framework that reflects and harmonizes 
their priorities, perspectives and approaches, including the 
South-South cooperation framework, with that of OECD 
countries and other key stakeholders. 
 Given the growing centrality and political influence of the 
emerging powers, the UN system has an important role to 
play in harnessing their full potential and facilitating 
development of a common policy framework that can 
sufficiently reflect their perspectives and priorities. 
 III. Peacebuilding: a paradigm shift 
32. Over the past decade, field-based multidimensional peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding missions have become the most visible 
expression of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, 
underscoring the interrelationship between peace and security, 
development, human rights and humanitarian action.62 However, 
given that 90 per cent of conflicts between 2000 and 2009 
occurred in countries that had previously experienced civil war,63 
this approach began to be questioned as a short-term ‘missions 
only’ approach, severely handicapped by the lack of long-term 
funding, rapidly deployable and skilled civilian capacity, coherent 
policy and coordination between various actors. It came to be 
recognized that, to break the vicious cycles of conflict, sustainable 
peacebuilding perspectives would have to be mainstreamed from 
the very first stages of peace initiatives in fragile societies, 
furthering national ownership, the development of national 
capacities and empowerment of people affected by conflict.64 
National leadership and ownership were considered crucial to 
enabling national actors to set priorities and engage international 
partners in support of a common vision.65 This approach, 
however, further exacerbated the challenge of deploying the range 
of civilian expertise needed for transferring skills and knowledge 
to national actors from the start of a peace process, and required 
considerable enhancement of the partnership between the UN and 
member states.66 
33. While reasons for relapse into conflict varied from country to 
country, a deficit in confidence and trust between political parties 
and social groups and between state and society, due to problems 
                                                          
62  For instance, at its 6479th meeting (S/PV.6479) and in the relevant presidential 
statement (S/PRST/2011/4), the Council underscored a comprehensive approach 
that strengthened coherence between political, economic and social support 
activities and addressed the underlying causes of each conflict. 
63  Statement delivered by the Secretary-General at the 6847th meeting of the Security 
Council, S/PV.6847, p.2.  
64  S/PRST/2010/18, p. 3. 
65  Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict, S/2010/386, p. 7. 
66  S/2011/527. Also see a DPKO/DFS non-paper, A new partnership agenda: charting 
a new horizon for UN peacekeeping, 2009. 
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of inclusion and accountability, emerged as a major factor in 
triggering a relapse into conflict.67 Differentiating between fragile 
and stable developing environments, the 2011 World 
Development Report noted that, although institutional legitimacy 
was the key to stability, restoring public confidence in the political 
process was even more important before institutions could be 
transformed so as to deliver security, justice and jobs.68 An 
inclusive process, representing and reconciling the views and 
needs of a broad cross-section of society on matters related to 
peace and security, development, human rights and humanitarian 
action, would build confidence among parties to the conflict and 
other stakeholders that their core objectives could be achieved 
through negotiation rather than violence. Inclusive processes, 
mechanisms and participatory dialogue that allowed for the 
inclusion of diverse perspectives were also likely to enable 
development of sustainable local and national capacities for the 
peaceful resolution of disputes. In fragile societies, therefore, 
inclusivity needed to be deliberately built and applied throughout 
the peacebuilding process, starting with analysis, design and 
planning.69 The linkages between inclusivity, institution building 
and sustained international support were seen as central to 
securing a sustainable peace. Consequently, in a mere five years, 
integrated field missions and the DPA witnessed a tripling of their 
mandated tasks and responsibilities related to the facilitation of 
political processes, inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, 
preventive diplomacy, good offices, mediation, support to peace 
processes and peace agreement monitoring and implementation, 
and more interaction with and support to regional and subregional 
organizations.70 This pattern has been most evident for missions 
located in Africa.71  
34. The imperatives of inclusivity, national leadership and ownership 
emphasize demand-driven, targeted and context-specific 
international assistance, adapting lessons and solutions from 
                                                          
67  Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict, S/2012/746, para. 2. 
68  World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, pp. v and 
11.  
69  S/2012/746, paras. 35–40. 
70  Cedric de Coning (2011): Civilian Peacekeeping Capacity: Mobilizing Partners to 
Match Supply and Demand, International Peacekeeping, 18:5, pp. 577–592.  
71  For a detailed analysis of mandates of field missions, see the Repertoire of the 
Practice of the Security Council, 2010–2011, Part X, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/overview.shtml.  
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potential partners to the local political, economic and social 
context. The changing landscapes of peacebuilding and focus on 
building sustainable national capacities over long term have 
underscored the relevance of exchange of experiences, expertise, 
policy input and assistance with countries from the region and the 
Global South that share regional, political or socio-cultural 
characteristics and had recently experienced transitions of their 
own, within the framework of South–South cooperation. With the 
emphasis on partnership among equals for mutual benefit, it has 
not been uncommon for the same country to serve both as a 
provider as well as a recipient of expertise. Botswana, for example 
has collaborated with Liberia on the capacity development of the 
Liberian police force,72 similar to cooperation between Guinea 
Bissau and Angola on the capacity development of Angolan armed 
forces. At the same time, both Botswana and Guinea Bissau have 
been recipients of expertise in other sectors. South–South 
cooperation, with its emphasis on national leadership and 
building national capacities, has offered the potential to become a 
catalyst for successful conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
efforts, and create sustainable conditions for shared prosperity, 
peace and stability – when situated in a coherent and mutually 
reinforcing policy framework for peace and development.73 
35. The potential of development-focused South–South cooperation is 
increasingly being recognized for channelling long-term, cost-
efficient and relevant support to conflict-affected countries facing 
urgent demands for greater national ownership, development of 
national capacities and empowerment of people affected by 
conflict. For the DPA, as the lead for delivering UN system-wide 
support as regards inclusive political processes, the enhancement 
of partnerships with emerging powers like Brazil, India, South 
Africa and others holds tremendous relevance: such countries 
have experience and skills in transitioning into vibrant and 
inclusive political systems and increasing willingness to support 
home-grown and bottom–up democratic and inclusive processes 
in conflict-affected countries and promote the ‘human approach’ 
that intrinsically linked poverty elimination with security. Besides 
historical ties and sense of solidarity, these countries have 
significant commercial interests in the conflict-affected countries 
                                                          
72  S/2012/645, para. 21.  
73 Fritz Nganje, ‘Decentralized South–South cooperation: A Complementary Vehicle for 
State-Building in Post-Conflict Societies in Africa?’, March 2013, Africa Up Close, 
http://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/decentralised-south-south-cooperation-a-
complementary-vehicle-for-state-building-in-post-conflict-societies-in-africa/ . 
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on the agenda of the Security Council and the Peacebuilding 
Commission and consequently share a strong interest in 
maintaining peace and stability in those countries. However, 
despite the increasing role of emerging countries in fragile 
societies and the contacts, leverage and ‘entry points’ they could 
offer, relatively little has been done to systematically reflect their 
interests and influence into a coherent policy framework or 
harness the potential of South–South cooperation to effect 
security and development gains. 
36. Since sufficient infrastructure is lacking for South–South 
cooperation as regards conflict prevention, mediation and 
peacebuilding, such exchanges have generally been facilitated by 
a Western donor country or a multilateral organization like the UN 
in a triangular cooperation setting. One high visible example of 
such triangular cooperation is the initiative for capacity 
enhancement in South Sudan, developed by the Government of 
South Sudan and the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), with UNDP support, and involving the 
deployment of civil servants from select English-speaking 
countries in the region (Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda) for one-on-
one coaching of  their South Sudanese counterparts (‘twinning’).74 
A similar project has been implemented in Afghanistan with 
collaboration between the Governments of Afghanistan and India 
and UNDP.75 Increasingly, conflict-affected countries have 
favoured facilitation and mainstreaming of South–South 
cooperation through such long-term triangular cooperation 
arrangements, also in situations where a UN political and 
peacebuilding mission was operational. The new peacebuilding 
approach and South–South cooperation framework can act to 
complement and reinforce each other.  
 
                                                          
74  For details, see Kristoffer N. Tarp and Frederik F Rosen (2012): Coaching and 
mentoring for capacity development, African Security Review, 21:1, pp. 15–30. See 
also 221_91202_NOREF_Report_DaCosta_web.pdf; Diana Felix da Costa et al, 
Triangular cooperation for government capacity development in South Sudan, 
NOREF Policy Brief, April 2013 (Triangular cooperation for capacity development 
Noref.pdf); pb2013 Civilian Capacity frro web.pdf; Diana Felix da Costa et al, With a 
little help from my friends: cultural affinity in regional support for capacity 
development in South Sudan,’ NUPI Policy Brief No. 8, da Costa, Karlsrud, Rosén, 
Haldrup, Tarp-1.pdf; GG Turning to the South.pdf.  
75  Frederik F Rosen (2011): No words will deliver anything. Coaching and mentoring as 
neoliberal governance strategy in the Afghan State Administration, Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 5(2) 2011, pp. 151–173.  
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Summary observations & recommendations 
 Evolving approaches to conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding have given salience to national ownership and 
development of self-sustaining institutions, capacities and 
inclusive processes that can provide basic security, social 
cohesion, governance, justice and a sufficient foundation for 
democratic and equitable development in the long term. 
 South–South cooperation, with its emphasis on demand-
driven, context-specific, long-term partnerships among 
equals, and involving sharing of relevant expertise and 
experiences between developing countries, has shown the 
potential to become a catalyst for successful peacebuilding 
efforts, also as regards inclusive political processes. 
 In the absence of sufficient national support structures, 
triangular cooperation has become indispensable to the 
expansion of developmentally-focused South–South 
cooperation to the peace and security pillar.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IV. South–South cooperation in 
peacebuilding mandates 
37. Recognizing on the one hand that peacebuilding was primarily a 
national challenge and responsibility, and on the other hand that 
fragile societies often face a critical shortage of capacities needed 
to prevent relapse into conflict and secure a sustainable peace,76 
in 2009 the Security Council stressed the need to deepen and 
broaden the pool of rapidly deployable expertise, particularly 
relevant expertise from the region and developing countries: 
…stresses the need, in countries emerging from conflict, to draw upon and 
develop existing national capacities at the earliest possible stage, and the 
importance of rapidly deployable civilian expertise to help achieve this, 
including, where appropriate, relevant expertise from the region. The 
Council, in this regard, welcomes the recommendation of the Secretary-
General for a review to be undertaken to analyse how the United Nations 
and international community can help to broaden and deepen the pool of 
civilian experts, giving particular attention to mobilizing capacities from 
developing countries and especially women. (S/PRST/2009/23) 
38. Subsequently – in view of the recommendations contained in the 
civilian capacity review report,77 thematic reports of the Secretary-
General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict,78 
civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict,79 and the country-
specific report on South Sudan80 – the Council reiterated in 
several related decisions the importance and relevance of tapping 
into civilian expertise from the Global South. In a presidential 
                                                          
76  UNDP is coordinating an interagency group to develop system-wide principles and 
guidelines to better use and develop national capacities. 
77  The report defined ‘civilian capacity’ as personnel with the requisite substantive 
expertise who could be deployed to the field. It did not deal with other important 
aspects of capacity such as funding, policy, guidance, training and logistics. The 
recommendations were presented within a vision called OPEN, thus called because 
the aim was to enable national ownership; work in global partnership; deliver 
expertise; and be nimble in the face of often very turbulent interventions. For 
details, see S/2011/85.  
78  S/2010/386 and S/2012/746. 
79  S/2009/304, S/2011/527 and S/2012/645. 
80  S/2012/486. In case of South Sudan, the recommendation has been mainstreamed 
and embedded in the mandate of UNMISS. 
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statement adopted on 20 December 2012,81 underlining the 
usefulness of sharing the experiences of countries which had gone 
through conflict and post-conflict situations and comparable 
transitions, the Council for first time emphasized ‘the importance 
of effective regional, south–south and triangular cooperation’. 
Furthermore, by resolution 2057 (2012), the Council underscored 
the importance and relevance of tapping into civilian expertise 
from the Global South in the specific context of South Sudan and 
the United Nations Mission in South Sudan:82 
The Security Council recognizes the need to broaden and deepen the pool of 
civilian experts, in particular from developing countries and women, to help 
develop national capacity, and encourages Member States, the United 
Nations and other relevant partners to strengthen cooperation and 
coordination in building such capacities. (S/PRST/2010/7) 
Recognizing the need to broaden and deepen the pool of available civilian 
experts, especially women and experts from developing countries, to help 
develop national capacity, and encouraging Member States, the United 
Nations and other partners to strengthen cooperation and coordination to 
ensure that relevant expertise is mobilized to support the peacebuilding 
needs of the Government and people of the Republic of South Sudan 
(S/RES/2057 (2012)) 
The Security Council encourages national Governments, the United Nations, 
regional and sub-regional organizations to broaden and deepen the pool of 
civilian expertise for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, 
including from countries with relevant experience in post-conflict 
peacebuilding or democratic transition, giving particular attention to 
mobilizing capacities from developing countries and from women, as vital 
for successful United Nations peacebuilding endeavours. The Council also 
encourages national Governments, the United Nations and regional and 
sub-regional organizations to use existing civilian expertise and further 
develop them, bearing in mind the necessity to minimize possible 
duplication of efforts and to ensure their consistency and complementarity. 
The Council further underlines the importance that intergovernmental 
deliberations take forward the process in accordance with General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/66/255 and the imperative of mandating and deploying 
civilian expertise in compliance with relevant United Nations rules and 
procedures. (S/PRST/2012/29) 
The Security Council underlines the usefulness of sharing the experience of 
countries which have gone through conflict and post-conflict situations and 
                                                          
81  S/PRST/2012/29. 
82  In collaboration with IGAD and UNDP, the Government of South Sudan chose to 
implement a capacity-building initiative involving three regional capacity providers. 
UNMISS was not a partner although it was mandated by Security Council resolution 
2057 (2013) to mobilize relevant expertise to support the peacebuilding needs of 
the Republic of South Sudan.  
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comparable transitions, and emphasizes the importance of effective 
regional, south–south and triangular cooperation. (S/PRST/2012/29) 
Encourages national governments, the United Nations, regional and 
subregional organizations to continue to use existing civilian expertise and 
also to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian capacities for peacebuilding 
in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including from countries with 
relevant experience in post-conflict peacebuilding or democratic transition, 
giving particular attention to mobilizing capacities from developing 
countries and from women, and in this regard, stresses the imperative of 
mandating and deploying civilian capacities in compliance with relevant 
United Nations resolutions and rules and procedures, and with a view to 
minimizing duplication of efforts and ensuring consistency and 
complementarity. (S/RES/2086, 2013) 
39. Similarly, by resolution A/RES/66/655, the General Assembly 
affirmed: 
... the fundamental principle of national ownership, and stressing the 
importance of supporting national civilian capacity development and 
institution building, including through peacekeeping operations in 
accordance with their mandates, as well as enhanced regional, South–South 
and triangular cooperation,  
Encouraging national Governments, the United Nations and regional and 
subregional organizations to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian 
expertise for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including 
from countries with relevant experience in post-conflict peacebuilding or 
democratic transition, giving particular attention to mobilizing capacities 
from developing countries and of women as vital to the success of United 
Nations peacebuilding endeavours 
40. The recent calls for tapping into the expertise and experiences of 
the Global South and mainstreaming of the modality of South–
South cooperation for effective peacebuilding have come in the 
wake of identification of critical gaps in deployable civilian 
capacity, as well as the identification of potential suppliers of such 
important capacities in the Global South – including emerging 
powers such as India, Brazil and South Africa (the ‘IBSA 
coalition’), on three different continents but sharing socio-
economic, cultural or linguistic composition and a history of 
solidarity support with their neighbours and other developing 
countries. Most importantly, several countries of the Global South 
have evolved into vibrant democracies and possess unique 
experience with democratization, experience that might serve as 
models for countries in transition, including the ‘Arab Spring’ 
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countries.83 All three IBSA countries have had bilateral technical 
assistance programmes with conflict-affected countries within the 
umbrella of South–South cooperation and have acquired extensive 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding experience in fragile and 
unstable settings. The frameworks of regional and multilateral 
programmes could offer these countries the necessary systematic 
support and political legitimacy to upscale their support in 
transforming and building national institutions and inclusive 
political processes in conflict-affected countries.  
Summary observations & recommendations 
 Mandates of key intergovernmental bodies have stressed 
the need to broaden and deepen the pool of rapidly 
deployable civilian expertise and experiences from 
countries which have undergone post-conflict situations 
or democratic transitions, in particular from developing 
countries; and to strengthen cooperation and 
coordination in building such civilian capacities, 
minimizing possible duplication of efforts and ensuring 
consistency and complementarity. 
 These mandates have emphasized the importance of 
regional, triangular and South–South cooperation for 
effective international assistance to conflict-affected 
countries, and have encouraged the UN and its partners 
to play a catalytic role in facilitating development of a 
coherent policy framework and relevant structures and 
processes. 
 
 
                                                          
83  International Peace Institute (IPI), Managing Transitions in the Arab World, seminar 
report, June 2012. See also IPI, Should emerging Arab regimes look to Turkey as a 
model? Global Observatory update, 16 January 2012. 
 V. Mapping and matching 
Southern capacities  
41. With a view to bridging the gap between demand and supply and 
making a global civilian capacity partnership effective, the 2011 
Independent Civilian Capacity Review identified five priority areas 
or clusters where countries emerging from conflict tend to 
experience critical capacity gaps: safety and security, justice, 
inclusive political processes, core government functionality, and 
economic revitalization. It also listed the lead actors within the UN 
system responsible for delivering the specialized capacities in each 
of the identified five priority sectors/subsectors, as well as key UN 
and non-UN providers of those capacities by sector. Building on 
this information, in September 2012, a self-service online platform 
CAPMATCH84 or an ‘inclusive and transparent market place’85 for 
providers and requestors of civilian capacities was launched, 
aimed at broadening the range of potential providers, primarily 
from the Global South, in precisely the five areas identified 
above.86  
42. Serving a similar ‘global connector’ role, the World Bank and 
several UN departments, agencies and programmes have also 
developed knowledge-sharing platforms and rosters of experts in 
their respective areas of expertise for purposes of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation programmes in mission as well as non-
mission settings. For example, the World Bank Institute has 
launched an action learning and south-to-south Knowledge 
Exchange Programme for g7+ countries. This programme captures 
lessons in New Deal pilot countries and connects practitioners and 
key national stakeholders to innovation in fragile states (and 
beyond). It shares cross-country lessons and experiences that 
make it possible to design and implement concrete national level 
reforms. Transparency and related open government agenda 
issues such as natural resource management and citizen 
                                                          
84  For more information, see https://capmatch.dfs.un.org or www.civcapreview.org  
85  Paul Keating and Sharon Wiharta, CIVCAP 2012: laying concrete foundations, NUPI 
Policy Brief, September 2012. 
86  For a sampling of exchanges of practical South–South experiences, see 
S/2012/645, p. 8.  
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engagement and participation feature as initial priority areas of 
the Knowledge Exchange programme. Similarly, the United 
Nations Environmental Programme has established a South–South 
cooperation exchange mechanism (http://www.unep.org/south-
south-cooperation/unepssc/history.aspx) to enhance its ability to 
deliver environmental capacity-building and technology-support 
activities in developing countries and regions of the South. The 
African Development Bank also has a specific facility for South–
South cooperation in fragile states.87 
43. Recognizing the opportunities offered by South–South 
cooperation, several governments, directly or in partnership with 
regional organizations, and private organizations have made 
triangular and South–South cooperation an integral part of their 
overall foreign policy assistance frameworks. The Norwegian 
government, for example, has collaborated with several semi-
autonomous national institutions – among them, the Norwegian 
Refugee Council, which maintains the NORCAP roster with a wide 
mix of nationalities, including from the South, in its register. 
Norway has been assisting the African Union to build a civilian 
standby roster for the civilian component of the African Standby 
Force, mediation and post-conflict reconstruction and 
development. Through the Training for Peace (TfP) programme, a 
collaborative arrangement between African training and conflict 
resolution institutions, the Norwegian Police Directorate and the 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway is also 
supporting the African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian 
and Peace Building Missions (AFDEM).88 
44. To address the need for in-depth exchanges among international 
actors on technical issues and find solutions regarding policy 
frameworks, institutional arrangements and enabling legislation, 
governments and institutions have established dedicated focal 
points and civilian capacity programmes with web portals, 
communities of practice, rosters, training and evaluation 
frameworks.89 Such efforts have increasingly included countries 
from the Global South. NUPI has established a South–South–
North network, with partners in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
                                                          
87  2011 World Development Report, Overview, p.44, footnote 104. 
88  For details, see John Karlsrud, Adapting Norwegian civilian capacity for the future: 
implications of the Guehenno Report, NOREF Policy Brief, No. 5, September 2011.  
89  See for example, CIVCAP, a project led by Center for International Peace Operation-
ZIFs, in collaboration with the German Federal Foreign Office  
 https://www.civcap.info/about-civcap.html.  
Anita Mathur 
 
40 
Norway, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, to promote exchange of 
information and experiences on the development of policies, 
strategies, mechanisms and structures in the participating 
countries, which have emerged as important providers of civilian 
capacities for peace operations.90 A similar project has been 
undertaken by the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI).91  
45. Revolutionary improvements in connectivity within and among 
developing countries themselves, as a result of complex networks 
of experts, officials, institutional linkages and knowledge 
exchange programmes, have promoted South–South cooperation 
portals and greater opportunities for exchanges of Southern 
solutions and innovations among countries facing challenges like 
conflict and natural disasters and cross-border issues such as arms 
transfers and HIV/AIDS. 
Summary observations & recommendations 
 Member states, multilateral institutions and non-
governmental organizations have made significant 
progress in developing instruments and tools for 
mapping and matching relevant expertise and 
experiences from the Global South in the areas of peace 
and security, and widening and deepening the pool of 
deployable civilian capacities and models of transition in 
support of fragile societies.  
 Instead of reinventing the wheel and duplicating efforts, 
the UN and the DPA should take stock of and attempt to 
connect the various instruments – including rosters of 
experts and knowledge-sharing networks existing within 
(e.g. CAPMATCH) and outside – with a view to 
mainstreaming triangular and South–South cooperation 
in their work, and forming effective partnerships to 
facilitate South-to-South exchanges. 
 
                                                          
90  For details, see http://www.nupi.no/Virksomheten/Forskningsprosjekter/Network-
Civilian-Capacity-for-Peace-Operations-in-a-Changing-World-Order. 
91  http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/pko/civilian_contribution. 
 VI. South–South cooperation, 
emerging powers and the DPA: 
charting the way forward 
46. The DPA has evolved from a traditionally desk-bound, analytical 
organization into an increasingly operational and results-oriented 
organization in response to the rapidly changing peace and 
security landscape and demands from intergovernmental bodies 
to provide more effective and strategic political leadership in 
conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding. As the 
Department is yet to make the transition to service both the 
Secretariat and the field in areas of its core mandate, there have 
been even greater demands for its services, given the renewed 
focus on the use of political tools of diplomacy and mediation 
combined with the provision of long-term capacity-development 
support to conflict-affected countries in preventing, managing and 
resolving conflicts as well as building effective and inclusive 
institutions as a basis for sustainable peace.92 
47. Given the need to deliver promptly a wide range of complex and 
specialized services in a context of limited resources, evolving 
approaches to conflict prevention, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding that underscore national ownership, long-term 
tailored international support, and collaboration with increasingly 
active and capable actors from the Global South, including 
regional and subregional organizations (as detailed in parts I–V of 
this report), it has become necessary for the DPA to reassess and 
redefine its priorities, tools and approaches, including the value 
added for its work, operational effectiveness and partnerships of a 
resurgent South–South cooperation framework.  
48. Select divisions within the DPA have already, albeit on an ad hoc 
basis, recognized the enhancement of partnership with emerging 
powers in the Global South as critical to the success of their 
programmes, and have indirectly supported the South–South 
                                                          
92  This section of the report draws extensively upon the DPA website and the 2011–
2013 Multi-Year Appeal documents prepared to explain the work of the DPA to 
donor countries. 
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cooperation framework. Awareness and evidence of these 
scattered initiatives and shared understanding of the value added 
by South–South cooperation could encourage more consistent 
mainstreaming of South–South cooperation in all areas of the 
DPA’s work; development of an enabling DPA-wide policy 
framework that has otherwise significantly lagged behind the 
evolving practice; and buy-in within the DPA to lead system-wide 
efforts to formulate a coherent policy framework to facilitate 
expansion of South–South cooperation into the peace and security 
pillar of the UN’s work, as a cross-cutting issue.  
Political capacity-building and knowledge-sharing 
 
49. Facilitation of triangular and South–South cooperation within the 
DPA is evident in the assistance activities and initiatives of, inter 
alia, the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD), the Policy and 
Mediation Division (PMD) and the Division for Palestinian Rights 
(DPR). The EAD, with a key policy development role93 at 
headquarters and extensive support to electoral assistance 
activities in mission and non-mission settings,94 offers a pertinent 
case. In addition to providing political guidance,95 quality control, 
electoral roster management and institutional memory, it has built 
strong partnerships with regional and other intergovernmental 
organizations to ensure appropriate working arrangements with 
them and to help build their electoral capacity where appropriate. 
It has also contributed to initiatives that have helped to promote 
exchanges and partnerships through an electoral information 
network, as well as South–South election assistance. Such 
cooperation has involved members of the Federal Electoral 
                                                          
93  The DPA and the EAD, as the focal point for electoral assistance, considered vital to 
implementation of peace agreements and inclusive transitions, have ensured 
system-wide coherence and consistency within a broad array of UN entities. For 
example, in 2010 the DPA and UNDP signed a revised note of guidance on electoral 
assistance to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities. For details, see 
A/66/314, p.6. 
94  In 2012, the UN and EAD assisted some 60 member states and territories through 
technical support to electoral processes, as well as support to mediation exercises 
dealing with election-related issues, dispatch of ‘good offices missions’ to help 
increase confidence in election processes while mitigating the risk of election-
related violence, and the establishment of high-level electoral panels providing 
recommendations based on an assessment of the political and electoral 
environment. 
95  EAD, UN Focal Point for Electoral Assistance, Policy Directive, Principles and Types 
of UN Electoral Assistance, 11 May 2012. 
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Institute of Mexico and the Electoral Tribunal of Panama,96 among 
others. In addition, the DPA and EAD have maintained a roster of 
pre-screened electoral experts who can be quickly deployed to any 
UN assistance presence.97 Other recent knowledge-sharing and 
partnership-building initiatives have included arranging 
workshops between election stakeholders to build on comparative 
experiences in order to develop improved electoral processes.98 
50. While providing substantive and operational support to the 
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People, the DPR has both facilitated South–South 
cooperation and partnered with emerging powers that have 
favoured a peaceful solution to the Palestinian question. In the 
latter context, the Division has closely monitored and recorded 
perspectives of the emerging powers and of regional groups in the 
UN Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL). 
Through its programme of meetings and workshops, the Division 
has served as a knowledge broker and partnership builder, 
bringing together experts from governments, civil society and 
academia in the search for peaceful solutions. For example, in 
2013 the UN International Meeting on the Question of Palestine 
was dedicated to drawing upon the experience of African states in 
anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles, as well as in post-
colonial efforts to build effective governments and economies.99 
Furthermore, the Division maintains a roster of experts and a 
roster of civil society organizations, including from the region and 
the Global South. 
51. Nowhere has the need for harnessing systematically the wealth of 
knowledge, expertise and resources in the Global South and 
promoting South–South cooperation been underscored more than 
in the context of the Security Council-mandated multi-dimensional 
special political missions (SPMs) and expanding their assistance 
for peacebuilding, good governance and democratization.100 In 
                                                          
96 http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/elections/partnerships.  
97  For example, in the case of Libya, EAD set itself a concrete target of pre-screening 
and including in the team of electoral experts half of whom were Arabic-speaking 
and 30 per cent were women. 
98  For example, in 2010, EAD and UNDP, in cooperation with the government of 
Romania, organized a workshop on out-of-country voting in order to identify a set of 
good practices and guidelines. 
99 http://unispal.un.org/databases/dprtest/ngoweb.nsf/ 
f12fded4d0597000852573fc005b9471/aa987555796e811085257b3300638819
?OpenDocument.  
100  DPA Strategic Plan, 2014–2015. 
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2000, when there were eight DPA-supported SPMs, the typical 
mission had four different core sets of mandated tasks. In 2003, 
the average number of mandated tasks had increased to seven, 
and by 2010 half of such missions had mandates for some 12 to 
24 complex tasks,101 including the provision of assistance to 
national and local-level initiatives to foster dialogue, build 
capacity, and prevent violence.102 In the follow-up to the 2011 
Civilian Capacity Review,103 the DPA proposed to support 
triangular and South–South cooperation in ‘every cluster and sub-
cluster of its work and include in the terms of reference of each 
global service provider’.104 For the first time, a civilian capacity 
gap model105 was employed to identify requirements of the DPA-
led UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and mobilize civilian 
capacities and approaches from the region, as appropriate – 
including police trainers from Jordan, strategic planners from the 
Palestinian Authority and specialists from Gaza to counsel 
combatants.106 Similarly, with support from the Peacebuilding 
Fund, Liberian experts with security-sector reform experience 
were deployed to the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire.107 
                                                          
101  Report of the Secretary-General, Review of arrangements for funding and 
backstopping special political missions, A/66/340, p. 6.  
102  Cedric de Coning (2011), Civilian Peacekeeping Capacity: Mobilizing Partners to 
Match Supply and Demand, International Peacekeeping, 18:5, pp. 577–592. 
103  The Review identified five priority areas where there were gaps in deployable 
civilian capacities in support of fragile societies, including in the area of inclusive 
political processes, consisting of the following clusters: constitutional 
processes; elections and electoral processes; mediation, good offices and 
conflict resolution; support to civil society; political party development; and 
public information and media.  
104  In a 2011 internal inter-agency paper, the DPA further proposed that instead of 
regulating how the support was provided, innovation would be encouraged 
through sharing of experiences of one cluster with another. It also considered 
existing partnerships with regional and subregional organizations, including 
desk-to-desk meeting, as another avenue. 
105  One of the three key lessons on which the civilian capacity model was based was 
that South–South cooperation had a special role. Countries from the Global 
South often had knowledge and expertise from their own experience of conflict, 
democratic transition or building capacities for conflict prevention. Sharing this 
could be of great practical value to countries facing similar challenges. For more 
information, see http://civcapreview.org/. 
106  Multi-year Appeal, 2013 Update, p.13; and author interviews with select DPA 
staff and a consultant. 
107  In the case of South Sudan, while the United Nations Mission for South Sudan 
was mandated by resolution 2057 (2012) to ensure that ‘relevant’ expertise was 
mobilized to ‘support the peacebuilding needs of the Government and people of 
the Republic of South Sudan’, the national Government limited its partnership to 
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52. The vast majority of South–South interactions have taken place 
within the region owing to commonality of history, language, 
culture, ethnicity, geographical proximity and shared interest in 
peace and stability.108 By strengthening the position and 
functional capacities of regional organizations in mediation, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the DPA has played a catalytic 
role in facilitating South–South cooperation at the regional as well 
as interregional level. Through information sharing and joint 
analysis of country and regional issues of mutual concern, regular 
‘desk-to-desk’ dialogues, comprehensive capacity-building 
assistance programmes, including the 10-Year Capacity-Building 
Programme for the African Union launched in 2006,109 joint 
training programmes for staff from regional organizations and the 
UN, establishment of regional and liaison offices, including the 
UN Office at the African Union (UNOAU), UN Office for West Africa 
(UNOWA), UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and UN 
Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, the 
DPA has fostered targeted capacity development, intraregional 
sharing of knowledge, expertise and best practices, adoption of 
joint negotiation positions, regional peacekeeping and the pooling 
of financial and other resources. With effective support and 
collaboration, regional organizations have increasingly served as 
first-line responders in national and regional preventive and 
peacemaking initiatives, promoting innovative regional 
approaches such as the African Peer Review Mechanism for 
promoting good governance in the region, and helping to dispel 
the notion that collaboration in peace and security matters 
necessarily undermines sovereignty or principles of non-
intervention. Regional organizations have also spurred 
interregional South–South and triangular cooperation,  including 
through mutual exchanges – as in the case of cooperation between 
the African Union and the Organization of American States in the 
context of adaptation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter to 
the African context and realities, in the form of the African Charter 
on Democracy, Elections and Governance.110 
                                                                                                                                        
UNDP and IGAD in implementing a capacity-building initiative with expertise 
specifically from the region. Author interview with senior UNDP senior 
management in the field. 
108  See for example, an ACCORD report entitled, The African Union Panel of Wise: 
Strengthening Relations with Similar Regional Mechanisms, June 2012. 
109  A/61/630. 
110  Author interview with senior DPA staff. See also http://au.int/en/partnerships. 
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53. Indicative of its operational shift and recent efforts to ensure that 
UN good offices, mediation, crisis response and capacity-building 
services were strengthened and rapidly deployable – including 
from the Global South111 – in 2012 the DPA 53 times deployed its 
diverse and specialized Standby Team of Mediation Experts,112 on 
72-hour notice, to assist UN and non-UN mediators in facilitating 
tailored regional, national and community-level political 
dialogues, mediation processes and other good offices efforts (e.g. 
Central African Republic, Georgia,  Libya, Somalia, the Sudan and 
Yemen), as well as responding to 33 requests for experts from its 
Mediation Roster. In the creation of the Mediation Roster of some 
200 experts, the DPA placed special emphasis ‘on the 
identification and promotion of expertise coming from the Global 
South’.113 It has increasingly served as a knowledge broker, also of 
Southern good practices and approaches, by linking expertise, 
experiences and technology and making available practical tools 
for prevention and peacemaking. These include the Guidance for 
Effective Mediation114 and the UN Peacemaker, an online 
repository of knowledge on peace agreements and mediation.115 
Notwithstanding these efforts to meet current demands and 
strengthen crisis response and capacity-building support to the 
UN and other partners, a 2012 report of the Secretary-General 
further recommended that the partnership development 
mechanism being contemplated should also focus on harnessing 
mediation and peacemaking capacity from, in particular the 
Global South and women in the South.116 The interoperability 
between DPA-wide rosters composed of experts with varied 
backgrounds and expertise117 and use of CAPMATCH could offer 
one of many possible options for addressing resource gaps and 
                                                          
111  The Secretary-General’s Five-Year Action Agenda, 2012. 
112  In 2010, the Standby Team was deployed 22 times. In 2012–2013, this number 
increased to 70 times. When not deployed to the field, the experts provide advice 
or analysis remotely, and work on the development of UN best practices and 
training materials in the areas of their expertise. 
113  DPA Factsheet, Mediation Roster, September 2011. 
114  A/66/811.  
115  Similarly, the DPA is in the process of developing and making available the ‘UN 
Constitutionmaker’. 
116  A/66/811, p. 62. 
117  UNDP’s Office for South–South cooperation has provided technical support in the 
design, development and maintenance of two rosters in the DPA (Mediation 
Roster in the Policy and Mediation Division and Roster of Experts in the Security 
Council Affairs Division), creating possibilities for interoperability between these 
two and other rosters in the DPA and possibly with the UNDP, the DPA’s close 
partner in the area of conflict prevention and capacity building. 
Role of South–South Cooperation and Emerging Powers in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding 47 
allowing greater utilization of experts and approaches from the 
Global South. 
Credible political analysis 
 
54. Since most of the DPA’s work takes place in or for the benefit of 
developing countries and is related to ongoing political processes 
to promote critical stability for economic development and other 
processes in conflict-affected countries,118 by sufficiently 
incorporating perspectives of the Global South as well as 
Southern/regional solutions and approaches, the DPA could serve 
an important role in providing the rest of the UN system with 
sound information, analysis and recommendations essential for 
developing effective policy responses, fostering trust with national 
governments and consensus among actors, and developing hybrid 
forms of international engagements for each priority case. 
However, this has been recognized as somewhat of a challenge by 
already-overburdened desk officers in regional DPA divisions who, 
often busy responding to one crisis after another and lacking 
guidance or support for pursuing innovative approaches that 
could draw on relevant models and recent experiences of 
democratic transitions in the Global South, have found themselves 
relying on widely accepted traditional approaches.119 Recently 
some efforts have been made to address this shortcoming. For a 
brief period, the Americas Division designated a focal point to 
collect and include information in the talking points for use by the 
Secretary-General and others on activities of countries in the 
region related to facilitation of South–South cooperation. This 
arrangement was discontinued, but there seems a clear need for it 
to be reinstated at the divisional120 or departmental level. 
Furthermore, joint assessments with regional organizations and 
regional offices, as well as recent initiatives to channel input from 
the pool of special envoys, UNDP country teams, including peace 
and development advisors, the specialized Standby Team of 
Mediators and the newly established Academic Advisory Council 
                                                          
118  In recognition of this, the DPA Trust Fund has been registered recently on the 
OECD List of ODA-eligible Organizations. DPA, Multi-year Appeal, 2013 update, p. 
11. 
119  Author interviews with DPA desk officers. 
120  A 2011 audit report of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU/REP/2011/3, pp. 35 and 47–
58) noted that out of 17 countries that had included a reference to South–South 
cooperation in their UNDAFs, seven were from Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela, underscoring the relevance of 
the framework to countries in the region. 
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on Mediation composed of individuals with a wide range of 
backgrounds, experiences and language skills, offer the potential 
to integrate various perspectives, better connect academic analysis 
with practice and promote the development of best practices, 
communities of practice and innovative pathways – including 
those specifically relating to facilitation of South–South 
cooperation as a cross-cutting thematic issue. In the context of 
expanding its range of information and options, the DPA’s 
strategic plan for 2014–2015 includes a recommendation for 
greater cooperation with intellectual leaders and civil society in 
the South. 
Outreach and advocacy 
 
55. As ‘non-intervention’ has gradually given way to ‘non-
indifference’ and the demand has risen for the DPA’s impartial and 
timely political analysis and interventions, without a 
commensurate increase in resources, the DPA has sought 
enhanced partnerships with traditional and non-traditional actors, 
extra-budgetary resources, effective solutions with a multiplier 
effect and a coherent policy framework to harmonize fragmented 
international responses. As part of these efforts, solidifying 
support for its activities in the Global South, the DPA’s largest 
constituency, including financial support from the emerging 
powers at this time of global austerity and going forward, is 
recognized as critical to bolstering the DPA’s resources, capacities 
and credibility.121 Financial contributions from emerging powers 
to the Peacebuilding Fund have amounted to over 3.9 per cent of 
the balance. In 2012, India joined the ranks of non-traditional 
donors to the DPA’s Trust Funds, together with Morocco and 
Turkey. However, for the support to continue and grow, the DPA 
would have to conduct more regular policy dialogues with the 
emerging powers,122 taking into consideration their priorities and 
perspectives as well as the commitment to triangular and South–
South cooperation. Together with PBSO, the DPA would need to 
adopt a bold public diplomacy and outreach strategy that could 
                                                          
121  In 2009, when DPA was attempting a second time to galvanize the support of 
developing countries that had serious reservations about strengthening DPA’s 
conflict prevention mandate and viewed it as a challenge to the principles of 
national sovereignty and non-intervention, South Africa seems to have played an 
instrumental role in reassuring the developing countries and winning their 
support for 49 new posts in DPA for its conflict-prevention activities.  
122  DPA strategic plan, 2014-2015, recommendation 2.6. 
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generate awareness about the specific programmes it has 
implemented to facilitate and support triangular and South–South 
cooperation. Then, after mapping and documenting all such 
‘islands of success’ and accompanying challenges, the DPA would 
be in a better position not only to demonstrate the proven 
relevance of triangular and South–South cooperation to its own 
work, but also to take up the role of an advocate and convenor of 
system-wide efforts to mainstream South–South cooperation in 
areas of peace and security that UN membership at large and the 
emerging powers particularly favour: and this could stimulate 
serious policy dialogue aimed at furthering the impact of the DPA 
and the UN in key national capitals on issues of importance.  
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Summary observations & recommendations 
 Some divisions within the DPA have, albeit on an ad hoc basis, 
deepened partnership with the emerging powers in the Global 
South and facilitated triangular and South–South cooperation 
through stand-alone projects. 
 In response to increasing demands from member states (including 
conflict-affected countries), and given the proven relevance to its 
own work, the DPA should give priority to mainstreaming 
triangular and South–South cooperation as a thematic and cross-
cutting issue across all aspects of its work. 
 To build departmental consensus and support, DPA-wide 
awareness and shared understanding of the value added by 
triangular and South–South cooperation needs to be generated 
through mapping and sharing of relevant experiences and projects 
implemented by various parts of the DPA.  
 To avoid reinventing the wheel and to leverage the existing 
architecture and normative consensus in support of South–South 
cooperation for its work, the DPA should advance its 
understanding of related system-wide and international processes 
and best practices, and participate in ongoing policy dialogues.  
 The DPA needs to identify a focal point to coordinate systematic 
development of department-specific guidance which can link 
policy with its evolving practice in facilitating triangular and 
South–South cooperation, and synchronize it with complementary 
system-wide guidance, tools and mechanisms.  
 The DPA, together with the PBSO, should take the lead in 
coordinating with other principal stakeholders in the system 
development of a common integrated and enabling policy 
framework to establish and promote the role of the UN and the 
DPA as advocate, convenor, knowledge broker and supporter of 
South–South cooperation across the peace and security pillar. 
 To harness the full potential of South–South cooperation, the DPA 
should deepen strategic and operational collaboration with the 
Global South, including the emerging powers and regional 
organizations as well as civil society and think-tanks. 
 The DPA should undertake a massive outreach to generate 
recognition and support for its efforts in facilitating triangular and 
South–South cooperation among non-traditional and traditional 
donors alike.. 
 
 Annex: Compilation of Summary 
Observations & Recommendations 
I. Resurgence of South–South cooperation: the game-
changer? 
 
 South–South cooperation, involving exchanges of affordable and 
appropriate knowledge, skills and solutions among developing 
countries, has been mandated as a priority by intergovernmental 
bodies, requiring the entire UN system to take steps towards 
integrating and institutionalizing it in their programmes and 
approaches.  
 The emergence of major economies in the Global South and their 
eagerness to assist other developing countries, including conflict-
affected countries, has resulted in the mainstreaming of triangular 
and South–South cooperation in peacebuilding activities, 
particularly in the complex task of building state capacity. 
 The nexus between security and development, fostered also in the 
post-2015 framework, has further underscored the need for wider 
application of developmentally-focused South–South cooperation 
across the peace and security pillar of the UN’s work. 
 UN system-wide efforts in 2012 towards developing a more 
systematic approach and operational guidelines for 
implementation of South–South cooperation have made it 
opportune for the DPA and concerned departments across the 
peace and security pillar to advance their understanding of 
processes and mechanisms facilitating South–South cooperation 
and assess the added value of triangular and South–South 
cooperation to areas of their work.  
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II. The new normal: exercise of soft power by Southern 
powers 
 
 Emerging powers have become major players in the provision of 
tailored and long-term assistance to conflict-affected countries 
within the framework of South–South cooperation, as well as their 
broader development cooperation programmes, growing 
commercial interests and foreign-policy aspirations for regional 
stability, dominance and a bigger role in global governance. 
 Emerging powers have promoted alternate models and approaches 
that prioritize national ownership and capacity-building, an 
intrinsic link between security and development, the ‘human 
approach’ with its emphasis on poverty elimination and food 
security as root causes of conflict, and the nexus between 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
 To take their engagement to the next level, emerging powers have 
explored novel modalities and partnerships to deepen policy 
coordination and pool resources in efforts to help each other and 
other developing countries as well as increase their collective 
bargaining power in multilateral forums. 
 Emerging powers have favoured consent-based regional, triangular 
and multilateral interventions and institutional support over 
bilateral arrangements to scale up their engagement in politically 
sensitive areas, including promotion of democratic values and 
inclusive political processes, while balancing commitment to 
South–South cooperation principles of sovereignty, non-
intervention and national ownership.  
 Wary of attempts to co-opt them into OECD-led international aid 
structures, emerging powers have looked to the UN to play a 
meaningful role in the development of an integrated and coherent 
policy framework that can reflect and harmonize their priorities, 
perspectives and approaches (including the South–South 
cooperation framework) with that of OECD countries and other key 
stakeholders.  
 Given the growing centrality and political influence of the emerging 
powers, the UN system has an important role in harnessing their 
full potential and facilitating the development of a common policy 
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framework that can sufficiently reflect their perspectives and 
priorities.  
III. Peacebuilding: a paradigm shift 
 
 Evolving approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding have 
given salience to national ownership and development of self-
sustaining institutions, capacities and inclusive processes that can 
provide basic security, social cohesion, governance, justice and a 
sufficient foundation for democratic and equitable development in 
the long term. 
 South–South cooperation, with its emphasis on demand-driven, 
context-specific, long-term partnerships among equals, and 
involving sharing of relevant expertise and experiences between 
developing countries, has shown the potential to become a catalyst 
for successful peacebuilding efforts, also as regards inclusive 
political processes. 
 In the absence of sufficient national support structures, triangular 
cooperation has become indispensable to the expansion of 
developmentally-focused South–South cooperation to the peace 
and security pillar.  
IV. South–South cooperation in peacebuilding mandates 
 
 Mandates of key intergovernmental bodies have stressed the need 
to broaden and deepen the pool of rapidly deployable civilian 
expertise and experiences from countries which have undergone 
post-conflict situations or democratic transitions, in particular from 
developing countries; and to strengthen cooperation and 
coordination in building such civilian capacities, minimizing 
possible duplication of efforts and ensuring consistency and 
complementarity. 
 These mandates have emphasized the importance of regional, 
triangular and South–South cooperation for effective international 
assistance to conflict-affected countries, and have encouraged the 
UN and its partners to play a catalytic role in facilitating 
development of a coherent policy framework and relevant 
structures and processes. 
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V. Mapping and matching Southern capacities 
 
 Member states, multilateral institutions and non-governmental 
organizations have made significant progress in developing 
instruments and tools for mapping and matching relevant expertise 
and experiences from the Global South in the areas of peace and 
security, and widening and deepening the pool of deployable 
civilian capacities and models of transition in support of fragile 
societies.  
 Instead of reinventing the wheel and duplicating efforts, the UN 
and the DPA should take stock of and attempt to connect the 
various instruments – including rosters of experts and knowledge-
sharing networks existing within (e.g. CAPMATCH) and outside – 
with a view to mainstreaming triangular and South–South 
cooperation in their work, and forming effective partnerships to 
facilitate South-to-South exchanges. 
VI. The DPA, emerging powers and South–South 
cooperation 
 
 Some divisions within the DPA have, albeit on an ad hoc basis, 
deepened partnership with the emerging powers in the Global 
South and facilitated triangular and South–South cooperation 
through stand-alone projects. 
 In response to increasing demands from member states (including 
conflict-affected countries), and given the proven relevance to its 
own work, the DPA should give priority to mainstreaming 
triangular and South–South cooperation as a thematic and cross-
cutting issue across all aspects of its work. 
 To build departmental consensus and support, DPA-wide 
awareness and shared understanding of the value added by 
triangular and South–South cooperation needs to be generated 
through mapping and sharing of relevant experiences and projects 
implemented by various parts of the DPA.  
 To avoid reinventing the wheel and to leverage the existing 
architecture and normative consensus in support of South–South 
cooperation for its work, the DPA should advance its 
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understanding of related system-wide and international processes 
and best practices, and participate in ongoing policy dialogues.  
 The DPA needs to identify a focal point to coordinate systematic 
development of department-specific guidance which can link policy 
with its evolving practice in facilitating triangular and South–South 
cooperation, and synchronize it with complementary system-wide 
guidance, tools and mechanisms.  
 The DPA, together with the PBSO, should take the lead in 
coordinating with other principal stakeholders in the system 
development of a common integrated and enabling policy 
framework to establish and promote the role of the UN and the DPA 
as advocate, convenor, knowledge broker and supporter of South–
South cooperation across the peace and security pillar. 
 To harness the full potential of South–South cooperation, the DPA 
should deepen strategic and operational collaboration with the 
Global South, including the emerging powers and regional 
organizations as well as civil society and think-tanks. 
 The DPA should undertake a massive outreach to generate 
recognition and support for its efforts in facilitating triangular and 
South–South cooperation among non-traditional and traditional 
donors alike. 
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